“Sacrifice Zones” in the Green Energy Economy: Toward an Environmental Justice Framework by Scott, Dayna & Smith, Adrian A.
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship
2017
“Sacrifice Zones” in the Green Energy Economy:
Toward an Environmental Justice Framework
Dayna Scott
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, dscott@osgoode.yorku.ca
Adrian A. Smith
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Repository Citation
Scott, Dayna and Smith, Adrian A., "“Sacrifice Zones” in the Green Energy Economy: Toward an Environmental Justice Framework"
(2017). Articles & Book Chapters. 2691.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works/2691
  
 
 
McGill Law Journal — Revue de droit de McGill 
 
“SACRIFICE ZONES” IN THE GREEN ENERGY 
ECONOMY: TOWARD AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
FRAMEWORK 
Dayna Nadine Scott and Adrian A. Smith* 
 
                                                  
*  Dayna Nadine Scott is an Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School and the Fac-
ulty of Environmental Studies at York University. Adrian A. Smith teaches in the De-
partment of Law and Legal Studies and the Institute of Political Economy at Carleton 
University. The authors would like to recognize with thanks the expert research as-
sistance provided by Osgoode joint MES/JD student Amanda Spitzig in the prepa-
ration of this article. 
© Dayna Nadine Scott and Adrian A. Smith 2017 
Citation: (2017) 62:3 McGill LJ 861 — Référence : (2017) 62:3 RD McGill 861 
 The environmental justice movement validates the 
grassroots struggles of residents of places which Steve Ler-
ner refers to as “sacrifice zones”: low-income and racialized 
communities shouldering more than their fair share of en-
vironmental harms related to pollution, contamination, tox-
ic waste, and heavy industry. On this account, disparities in 
wealth and power, often inscribed and re-inscribed through 
social processes of racialization, are understood to produce 
disparities in environmental burdens. Here, we attempt to 
understand how these dynamics are shifting in the green 
energy economy under settler colonial capitalism. We con-
sider the possibility that the political economy of green en-
ergy contains its own sacrifice zones. Drawing on prelimi-
nary empirical research undertaken in southwestern On-
tario in 2015, we document local resistance to renewable 
energy projects. Residents mounted campaigns against 
wind turbines based on suspected health effects and 
against solar farms based on arable land and food justice 
concerns, and in both cases, grounded their resistance in a 
generalized claim, which might be termed a “right to land-
scape”. We conclude that this resistance, contrary to typical 
framings which dismiss it as NIMBYism, has resonances 
with broader claims about environmental justice and may 
signal larger structural shifts worth devoting scholarly at-
tention to. In the end, however, we do not wholly accept the 
sacrifice zone characterization of this resistance either, as 
our analysis reveals it to be far more complex and ambigu-
ous than such a framing allows. But we maintain that tak-
ing this resistance seriously, rather than treating it as 
merely obstructionist to a transition away from fossil capi-
talism, reveals a counter-hegemonic potential at its core. 
There are seeds in this resistance with the power to push 
back on the deepening of capitalist relations that would 
otherwise be ushered in by an uncritical embrace of “green 
energy” enthusiasm. 
Le mouvement de justice environnementale confirme 
les luttes populaires des résidents des lieux que Steve Ler-
ner qualifie de « zones sacrifiées » : communautés racisées à 
faibles revenus qui assument plus de leur juste part de pré-
judices environnementaux associés à la pollution, la conta-
mination, les déchets toxiques et l’industrie lourde. À ce 
propos, les écarts de richesse et de pouvoir, souvent inscrits 
et réinscrits à travers les processus sociaux de racialisation, 
sont compris comme produisant des disparités au niveau 
des charges environnementales. Cet article tente de com-
prendre la façon dont ces dynamiques changent au sein de 
l’économie de l’énergie verte sous le capitalisme colonial. 
Nous considérons la possibilité que l’économie politique de 
l’énergie verte contienne ses propres zones sacrifiées. En 
nous basant sur une recherche empirique préliminaire me-
née dans le Sud-Ouest de l’Ontario en 2015, nous documen-
tons l’opposition locale aux projets d’énergie renouvelable. 
Des résidents ont mené des campagnes contre des éo-
liennes, suspectant des effets néfastes sur la santé, et 
contre des panneaux solaires installés sur des terres 
arables, sur la base de préoccupations de justice alimen-
taire, fondant leur opposition dans les deux cas sur une re-
vendication générale, qu’on pourrait définir comme un 
« droit au paysage ». Nous concluons que cette opposition, 
contrairement aux représentations typiques l’associant au 
phénomène de « pas dans ma cour », fait écho aux revendi-
cations plus larges de justice environnementale et peut si-
gnifier un changement structurel plus global valant la 
peine d’être étudié par les chercheurs. Toutefois, au final, 
nous n’acceptons non plus entièrement la caractérisation de 
« zone sacrifiée » employée par ce mouvement de résistance, 
puisque notre analyse révèle qu’elle est bien plus complexe 
et ambigüe que ne le permet une telle représentation. Mais 
nous maintenons que le fait de prendre ce mouvement de 
résistance au sérieux, plutôt que de le traiter comme 
s’opposant simplement à une transition vers des alterna-
tives au capitalisme fossile, révèle en soi un potentiel anti-
hégémonique. Cette opposition sème des graines ayant le 
pouvoir de repousser l’intensification des relations capita-
listes qui seraient autrement établies par l’adhésion sans 
réserve de l’enthousiasme de « l’énergie verte ». 
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Introduction 
 In this article, we examine the tensions and conflicts between move-
ments for climate justice, energy justice, and food justice, as they are 
emerging on the ground in the global North by taking seriously resistance 
struggles against renewable energy projects. We begin from the premise 
that climate justice requires consideration not only of whether to tackle 
climate change by transitioning from a fossil fuel economy, but more pro-
foundly of how to undertake that transition. In other words, there are, 
and will continue to be, distributional effects related to renewable energy 
generation. Critical environmental justice scholars need to attend to those 
effects as they emerge, with a focus on social dynamics, including race, 
class, gender, and settler colonialism.1 
 The environmental justice movement validates the grassroots strug-
gles of residents of places which Steve Lerner refers to as “sacrifice zones”: 
low-income and racialized communities shouldering more than their fair 
share of environmental harms related to pollution, contamination, toxic 
waste and heavy industry.2 On this account, disparities in wealth and 
power, often inscribed and re-inscribed through social processes of raciali-
zation, are understood to produce disparities in environmental burdens. 
Here, we attempt to understand how these dynamics are shifting in the 
green energy economy. In doing so, we join scholars in political ecology 
who are asking provocative questions “that confound the general under-
standing of environmental justice” as following a standard formula based 
on grassroots, “bottom-up” community reactions by people of colour in 
low-income neighbourhoods.3 We seek to better understand how critical 
environmental justice scholars should receive and theorize resistance that 
breaks this mold. Specifically, how should we react to movements of 
white, middle-class property owners articulating claims that resonate 
                                                  
1   “Critical Environmental Justice Studies” is a term adopted by David Pellow and Robert 
Brulle to refer to emerging scholarship, which attempts to incorporate attention to “how 
multiple social categories of difference are entangled in the production of environmental 
injustice,” among other critical interventions (see respectively David Naguib Pellow & 
Robert J Brulle, “Power, Justice, and the Environment: Toward Critical Environmental 
Justice Studies” in David Naguib Pellow & Robert J Brulle, eds, Power, Justice, and the 
Environment: A Critical Appraisal of the Environmental Justice Movement (Cambridge, 
Mass: MIT Press, 2005) 1; David N Pellow, “Toward a Critical Environmental Justice 
Studies: Black Lives Matter as an Environmental Justice Challenge” (2016) 13:2 Du 
Bois Rev 221 at 223). 
2   See Steve Lerner, Sacrifice Zones: The Front Lines of Toxic Chemical Exposure in the 
United States (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2010) at 3. 
3   Peter C Little, “Environmental Justice Discomfort and Disconnect in IBM’s Tainted 
Birthplace: A Micropolitical Ecology Perspective” (2012) 23:3 Capital Nature Socialism 
92 at 97. See also Julian Agyeman, Sustainable Communities and the Challenge of En-
vironmental Justice (New York: New York University Press, 2005) at 1–2. 
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with the values and aims that have motivated the environmental justice 
movement? What do we mean by “Environmental Justice for All”?4 Our 
study is based on preliminary empirical research employing qualitative 
methods undertaken in southwestern Ontario from April to August 2015. 
We conducted comprehensive key-informant interviews and participant 
observation with local residents and advocates to learn more about their 
concerns and resistance efforts in relation to renewable energy projects.5 
The data gathered through these methods were supplemented by a thor-
ough review of the publicly available documentary record. We organized 
our examination of the contours of local resistance to green energy accord-
ing to the way in which local residents and activists articulated those 
claims. For wind turbines, the concerns centered primarily on suspected 
adverse health effects; for solar farms, the concerns were expressed pri-
marily in relation to the loss of arable land and food justice. In both cases, 
resistance was grounded in a generalized claim which might be termed a 
“right to landscape”.  
 The question of NIMBYism6 and environmental justice was very much 
a part of the energy landscape in southwestern Ontario in the years pre-
ceding our study. In an example that culminated in a high profile political 
controversy, the provincial government reversed a siting decision, which 
would have placed two new gas plants in the “backyards” of the largely 
                                                  
4   See e.g. Environmental Justice Health Alliance for Chemical Policy Reform, Environ-
mental Justice for All, online: <ej4all.org>. 
5   We conducted six in-depth interviews with key informants identified first by local news 
media sources as local residents or activists with concerns about renewable energy pro-
jects, and subsequently through a snowball method. Two interviews were conducted 
with multiple informants present. In one case, we were invited to observe a meeting of 
several residents and activists. The interviews were approximately ninety minutes in 
length and were taped and transcribed. To preserve confidentiality, we anonymized the 
identities of the interview subjects, but specified the date and location of each interview. 
We also reviewed local media sources, as well as court and tribunal proceedings where 
available. We analyzed data through a process of analytic induction, identified three 
“themes” or types of claims, and selected quotes where illustrative of the points in dis-
cussion. 
6   The term “NIMBYism” refers to “not-in-my-backyard” syndrome. Definitions vary, but 
in general “NIMBYism” is used to refer to refusals to accept local impacts from the kind 
of development that would otherwise be supported if it were located elsewhere (see e.g. 
Maarten Wolsink, “Invalid Theory Impedes Our Understanding: A Critique on the Per-
sistence of the Language of NIMBY” (2006) 31:1 Transactions Institute British Geogra-
phers 85 at 86 [Wolsink, “NIMBY”]; Karena Shaw et al, “Conflicted or Constructive? 
Exploring Community Responses to New Energy Developments in Canada” (2015) 8 
Energy Research & Social Science 41 at 42). 
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privileged people of Oakville, Ontario.7 Katie Daubs, a journalist covering 
the well-organized resistance of the community quipped:  
 They may have more flat screen televisions than the average 
person, but the citizens of Oakville are human beings. If you prick 
them, they will bleed. If you wrong them, they will seek revenge. If 
you try to build a power plant next to a residential zone, they will fly 
in Erin Brockovich.8 
Most environmental justice struggles are narratives of solidarity, but oc-
casionally, as in Peter Little’s example of IBM’s legacy of a toxic “vapor in-
trusion” in primarily white Endicott, New York, there are stories of “con-
testation, discomfort, [and] disconnect”: contexts in which traditional en-
vironmental justice framings chafe.9 In this study, we confront not only 
the relative privilege of the affected communities, but the fact that the in-
dustry they oppose—renewable energy—is itself promoted and state-
sanctioned in “climate justice” terms. In other words, this is not merely a 
situation of relatively privileged residents fighting a proposed energy pro-
ject that could easily be framed as an environmental burden in the classic 
“sacrifice zone” sense, but rather one in which the kind of projects being 
proposed (and opposed) are those meant to assist in the transition away 
from fossil fuels, momentum towards a destination in which gas plants 
are “not in anyone’s backyard” (NIABY).10  
                                                  
7   To further complicate the matter from an environmental justice perspective, in an effort 
to compensate the companies affected by the decision to cancel the plants, “the govern-
ment gave each of them a new contract to build a plant somewhere else” (Adrian Mor-
row, “Ontario Liberals’ Gas-Plants Scandal: Everything You Need to Know”, The Globe 
and Mail (1 April 2015), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>). One gas plant ended up 
in the small town of Napanee, Ontario and the other in Lambton County, near Sarnia, 
which—according to the World Health Organization—already bears the burden of the 
worst air quality in the country, due to the presence of Canada’s “Chemical Valley” (see 
Tara Jeffrey, “Sarnia’s Air Canada’s Worst” Sarnia Observer (27 September 2011), 
online: <www.theobserver.ca>). In fact, the neighboring Aamjiwnaang First Nation recently 
withdrew a Charter challenge against the Ministry of Environment in Ontario, in which 
they claimed that the high air pollution burden affected them disproportionately as 
First Nations people (see Lockridge v Ontario (Director, Ministry of the Environment), 
2012 ONSC 2316, 350 DLR (4th) 720 (Div Ct)); Margot Venton et al, “Changing Course 
in Chemical Valley” (26 April 2016), Ecojustice, online: <www.ecojustice.ca>). 
8   Katie Daubs, “Oakville Brings in Erin Brockovich to Fight Power Plant”, Toronto Star 
(1 October 2010), online: <www.thestar.com>. Brockovich, of course, is the legendary 
environmental justice crusader depicted in the film Erin Brockovich directed by Steven 
Soderbergh (2003). 
9   Little, supra note 3 at 95, 105. 
10   The notion of “just sustainabilities” popularized by Julian Agyeman and his colleagues 
is an attempt to have scholars focus on not only the distribution of risk, but also the 
prevention of risks. This notion is sometimes captured by the “NIABY” acronym. This 
framework is a little more difficult to apply in the context of green energy projects, in-
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I. Sacrifice Zones 
 In the sacrifice zones of the industrialized global North, we find the 
“downwinders”: residents of pollution hot spots who live downwind and 
downstream of large industrial complexes of extraction, refining, and pet-
rochemical production, and who suffer the environmental health effects 
that go with it. These downwinders are the people whose experiences and 
resistance has occupied the focus of much of environmental justice re-
search to date.11 In classic conceptions, residents of sacrifice zones are 
members of low-income and racialized communities shouldering more 
than their fair share of environmental burdens.12 In one sense, then, the 
term “sacrifice zone” is “a trope used to describe disadvantaged communi-
ties and landscapes disproportionately contaminated and neglected in the 
name of capital accumulation.”13 More recently, scholars have started to 
more directly attribute the injustice of the lives of those residing in sacri-
fice zones to “fossil extractivism”, and to brand their resistance as a fight 
for “climate justice”.14 Participants in the resistance movement include 
      
tended as an alternative to the damaging conventional fossil fuel sources of generating 
energy (see generally Julian Agyeman, Robert D Bullard & Bob Evans, eds, Just Sus-
tainabilities: Development in an Unequal World (London: Earthscan, 2003)).  
11  See e.g. Luke W Cole & Sheila R Foster, From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism 
and the Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement (New York: New York University 
Press, 2001) at 19–33; Phil Brown, “Popular Epidemiology and Toxic Waste Contami-
nation: Lay and Professional Ways of Knowing” (1992) 33:3 J Health & Social Behavior 
267 [Brown, “Ways of Knowing”]; Phil Brown, “Popular Epidemiology Revisited” (1997) 
45:3 Current Sociology 137; Giovanna Di Chiro, “Environmental Justice from the 
Grassroots: Reflections on History, Gender and Expertise” in Daniel Faber, ed, The 
Struggle for Ecological Democracy: Environmental Justice Movements in the United 
States (New York: Guildford Press, 1998) at 104; Richard Hofrichter, ed, Toxic Strug-
gles: The Theory and Practice of Environmental Justice (Philadelphia: New Society, 
1993); Dara O’Rourke & Gregg P Macey, “Community Environmental Policing: As-
sessing New Strategies of Public Participation in Environmental Regulation” (2003) 
22:3 J Policy Analysis & Management 383; Dayna Nadine Scott, “Confronting Chronic 
Pollution: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Risk and Precaution” (2008) 46:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 
293; Peggy M Shepard et al, “Preface: Advancing Environmental Justice through 
Community-Based Participatory Research” (2002) 110 (supp 2) Environmental Health 
Perspectives 139. 
12   For a seminal work on environmentalism and social justice, see generally Robert D 
Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality (Boulder, Colo: 
Westview Press, 1990). 
13   Peter C Little, “On the Micropolitics and Edges of Survival in a Technocapital Sacrifice 
Zone”, online: (2016) Capitalism Nature Socialism 1 at 2 <http://www.tandfonline. 
com/loi/rcns>. 
14  See generally David Schlosberg & Lisette B Collins, “From Environmental to Climate 
Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice” (2014) 5:3 
WIREs Climate Change 359; Agyeman, Bullard & Evans, supra note 10; Paul Mohai, 
David Pellow & J Timmons Roberts, “Environmental Justice” (2009) 34 Annual Rev 
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people like Vanessa, a young Anishinaabe woman who lives on the Aam-
jiwnaang First Nation reserve, downwind of Canada’s Chemical Valley in 
southwestern Ontario, and has been photographed with a placard that 
reads, “This is what environmental racism looks like.”15 The movement 
also includes people like Carmen, a former “oilman” who took up ranching 
just north of Peace River, Alberta when the emissions from bitumen ex-
traction pushed his father into illness and off the land.16 In describing how 
the tar sands operators were drawing volatile hydrocarbons to the surface 
with a new process, and heating these hydrocarbons in open tanks so that 
they would waft down the valley, knocking people and cattle to their 
knees, Carmen stated, “we’re being gassed out here and nobody cares.”17 
 In this article, we turn our minds to the sacrifice zones created in the 
wake of green energy enthusiasm. In our conception, green energy enthu-
siasm constitutes not only the policy imperative to demonstrate progress 
in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and thus a mandate to move away 
from fossil extractivism, but also the deliberate decisions taken by gov-
ernmental authorities to remove the kinds of procedural protections and 
democratic controls that have become standard in relation to more con-
ventional energy projects.18 These decisions, we argue here, contribute to 
a striking resonance between the narratives of residents affected by green 
energy projects, most notably by wind turbines, and those in the sacrifice 
zones of fossil capitalism. Residents in the two types of sacrifice zone ar-
ticulate a shared sense that they are bearing all of the risks and reaping 
few of the rewards. 
      
Environment & Resources 405; David Schlosberg, “Reconceiving Environmental Jus-
tice: Global Movements and Political Theories” (2004) 13:3 Environmental Politics 517.  
15   This narrative draws on fieldwork conducted for Dayna Nadine Scott’s previous re-
search (see Dayna Nadine Scott, “‘We Are the Monitors Now’: Experiential Knowledge, 
Transcorporeality and Environmental Justice” (2016) 25:3 Soc & Leg Stud 261 [Scott, 
“Monitors Now”]). See also Michael Toledano, “A Toxic Tour of Canada’s Chemical Val-
ley”, VICE (23 March 2013), online: <www.vice.com>; Aamjiwnaang and Sarnia Against 
Pipeline (ASAP), Aamjiwnaang Solidarity Against Chemical Valley, online: <aam-
jiwnaangsolidarity.com>. 
16   See also Scott, “Monitors Now”, supra note 15; Micheal Toledano, “Albertans Are Aban-
doning Their Homes Due to Toxic Air”, VICE (20 February 2014), online: <www. 
vice.com>. 
17  Interview of Carmen (24 July 2014, Peace River, Alta). See also Scott, “Monitors Now”, 
supra note 15 at 267. 
18   Our point here is not to valorize conventional procedural protections and controls. In-
deed, there are important criticisms directed at these (see e.g. Robert B Gibson, “In Full 
Retreat: The Canadian Government’s New Environmental Assessment Law Undoes 
Decades of Progress” (2012) 30:3 Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal 179). 
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A. The Policy Imperatives Driving the Shift to Renewables 
 In this “post-Paris” world,19 climate change is regarded as a top policy 
priority. Governments all the world over are striving to be seen as making 
measurable progress toward the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Accordingly, Canadian provinces have adopted a range of policy 
measures with the stated aim of combatting climate change. The most no-
table examples are British Columbia’s well-established carbon tax,20 Al-
berta’s more recent carbon levy,21 Ontario’s Green Energy Act, 2009, estab-
lishing a feed-in tariff,22 as well as the cap-and-trade regime for green-
house gas emissions implemented in Quebec.23 A federal mandate also ex-
ists for imposing a pan-Canadian carbon price.24 All of these policy 
measures incorporate an accounting for greenhouse gas emissions intend-
ed to facilitate the transition away from fossil fuels. Massive new invest-
ments are occurring in renewables, such as solar and wind generation, as 
well as in hydro dam and nuclear refurbishment projects. In this latter 
respect, highly contested projects with serious adverse environmental ef-
fects, like British Columbia’s Site C Dam, Newfoundland’s Muskrat Falls, 
and the Deep Geological Repository for spent nuclear fuels near the Bruce 
Peninsula in Ontario, are now billed as “green energy” initiatives.25  
                                                  
19   See Paris Agreement, 22 April 2016 (entered into force 4 November 2016), COP 21 Re-
port, Addendum at 21–36, online: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/ 
10a01.pdf>. The agreement provides that each signatory nation will designate their 
greenhouse gas reduction goals as nationally determined commitments. The signatory 
states are then expected to adopt corresponding domestic climate change policies. As an 
example, Canada’s first nationally determined commitment pledges to reduce green-
house gas emissions by thirty percent below 2005 levels by 2030 (see “Canada’s INDC 
Submission to the UNFCCC”, online: United Nations Framework on Climate Change 
<www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Canada%20First/INDC%20-%20 
Canada%20-%20English.pdf>).  
20   See Carbon Tax Act, SBC 2008, c 40. 
21   See Climate Leadership Act, SA 2016, c C-16.9. 
22   See Green Energy Act, 2009, SO 2009, c 12, Schedule A (formerly the Green Energy and 
Green Economy Act, 2009). For background on the Feed-in Tariff Program which Ontar-
io launched in conjunction with the Green Energy Act, 2009, see e.g. Independent Elec-
tricity System Operator, “Ontario’s Feed-in Tariff Program Backgrounder” (16 Decem-
ber 2009), online: IESO <www.ieso.ca> [IESO, “Feed-in Tariff Program”].  
23   See Ministère du développement durable, Environnement et Lutte contre les change-
ments climatiques, “The Québec Cap and Trade System for Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Allowances”, online: MDDELCC <www.mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/ 
Systeme-plafonnement-droits-GES-en.htm>. 
24   See Shawn McCarthy, “Tory MPs Take Aim at Liberals’ Carbon Price Plan”, The Globe 
and Mail (19 September 2016), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>. 
25   See respectively Adrian Dix, “Christy Clark’s Big Sales Job on Site C”, The Tyee 
(12 October 2016), online: <www.thetyee.ca>; Garret Barry, “Ball Pitches Green N.L. 
Power to American Governors”, CBC News (29 August 2016), online <www.cbc.ca>; On-
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 In the context of growing green energy enthusiasm, we consider the 
possibility that, as political economist Simon Dalby puts it, “those that 
manage to connect to this new political economy are distinguished from 
those dispossessed and displaced by its voracious appetite for resources 
and land.”26 In fact, as we argue elsewhere in the context of the Site C 
dam project, it is possible to conceive of the residents of these new sacri-
fice zones as climate refugees of a different kind.27 In contrast to the im-
ages conjured by the alarmist mainstream discourse of rising sea levels 
causing brown and black bodies to wash up on “our” shores, these climate 
refugees are dispossessed and displaced not by climate change itself, nor 
by its devastating impacts, but rather by government actions to mitigate 
it. The category of “climate refugee” thus might include both those literal-
ly displaced and, in Rob Nixon’s terms, those displaced “without mov-
ing”—those struck by “a loss that leaves communities stranded in a place 
stripped of the very characteristics that made it inhabitable” for them in 
the past.28 In the case of the massive Site C dam, aiming to harness the 
power of the Peace River, the project receives green energy billing even 
though it will likely flood traplines and historic fishing spots on the tradi-
tional territory of the Treaty 8 First Nations.29 The “new” climate refu-
gees, then, would include marginalized peoples displaced within the glob-
al North by a rising tide of renewable energy enthusiasm inattentive to 
environmental justice.  
 In the next part, we detail the resistance to renewable energy projects 
which we observed on the ground in southwestern Ontario in 2015. The 
kinds of effects that are associated with the green energy projects we de-
scribe do not produce widespread dispossession or displacement, as the 
projects are largely small- and medium-scale wind and solar installations 
located in rural areas. Nor are the people mobilizing against the projects, 
in most cases, members of racialized or marginalized communities. In 
fact, they are mostly white, propertied citizens of rural areas. But it is 
      
tario Power Generation, “What Is the Deep Geologic Repository (DGR)?” (2016), online: 
OPG <opgdgr.com/>. 
26   Simon Dalby, “Environmental Geopolitics in the Twenty-first Century” (2014) 39:1 Al-
ternatives: Global, Local, Political 3 at 13. 
27   See generally Dayna Nadine Scott & Adrian A Smith, “The Abstract Subject of the Cli-
mate Migrant: Displaced by the Rising Tides of the Green Energy Economy” (2017) 8:1 
J Human Rights & Environment 30 at 31. 
28   Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2011) at 19. 
29   See BC Hydro, “FAQ”, Site C Clean Energy Project, online: <www.sitecproject.com/faq>; 
Sierra Club BC, Yellowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative & Peace Valley Envi-
ronment Association, “Site C Report” (2013), online: <sierraclub.bc.ca/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/08/Site-C-Report_low-res.pdf>. 
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possible to conceive of the people resisting these projects as residents of 
sacrifice zones in the conceptual sense, as they confront a state-imposed 
policy imperative that is justified in terms of the common good, but for 
which they believe their interests are being sacrificed. As mentioned, a 
critical aspect of green energy enthusiasm is the policy imperative to 
transition from fossil extractivism, paired with deliberate decisions by 
governmental authorities to forgo standard procedural protections, ave-
nues for democratic deliberation, and local control. 
 A key aim of this exercise is to sharpen our analytical tools as envi-
ronmental justice scholars within transitional terrain. The green energy 
economy ushers in an era which, in many cases, we have been agitating 
for. And yet, troubling signs suggest that not much has changed at a fun-
damental level, in terms of the underlying set of relations driving envi-
ronmental injustice.30 In this article, we consider whether those who resist 
green energy projects can be conceived as residents of sacrifice zones, tak-
ing their claims seriously and asking the hard questions raised by their 
objections to renewable energy projects, so as to sharpen our analytic tools 
for the coming shift.31 We hope the exercise can advance understanding of 
how scholars should approach this resistance in a way that is attentive to 
the core commitments of environmental justice scholarship.  
                                                  
30  This is not an entirely new phenomenon. In fact, sacrifice zones have been created 
across the global South. More recently, the “flexibility mechanisms” of the Kyoto Proto-
col treated carbon as a commodity (see Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, 2303 UNTS 162 arts 6, 12 (entered 
into force 16 February 2005)). “Joint implementation” tools established under the Kyoto 
Protocol, including the clean development mechanism, provided incentives for nations 
of the global North to “offset” their greenhouse gas emissions by investing in carbon se-
questration and renewable energy projects in developing countries (with palm oil plan-
tations being a key site of resistance) (see ibid, art 12). See also Emily Boyd, “Governing 
the Clean Development Mechanism: Global Rhetoric Versus Local Realities in Carbon 
Sequestration Projects” (2009) 41:10 Environment & Planning A 2380. For examples fo-
cusing on wind power specifically, see Shalanda H Baker, “Project Finance and Sus-
tainable Development in the Global South” in Shawkat Alam et al, eds, International 
Environmental Law and the Global South (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2015) 338. As Baker makes clear, “going green” has been a neoliberal project all along. 
She describes how Mexico’s 2008 Renewable Energy Law eased the way for private in-
vestment, which erased communal ownership over lands according to the ejido system. 
Large wind farm developers pressured local farmers to sign long-term leases and all of 
the power generated was sold exclusively to multinational cement producers, beverage 
companies, or Walmart (see ibid at 343). 
31   In a similar vein, Beatriz Bustos, Mauricio Folchi and Maria Fragkou ask, “If the es-
sence of injustice is disenfranchisement, if what generates environmental injustice is 
the decision-making system, we question whether a group that is not marginal, from a 
racial or economic point of view, can be the object of environmental injustice” (Beatriz 
Bustos, Mauricio Folchi & Maria Fragkou, “Coal Mining on Pastureland in Southern 
Chile: Challenging Recognition and Participation as Guarantees for Environmental 
Justice” (2016) 84 Geoforum 292 at 296). 
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II. Resistance to Green Energy Projects in Ontario  
 The emergence of Ontario’s green energy economy began around 2005, 
and was cemented with the enactment of the Green Energy Act, 200932. 
The purposes of the act include “fostering the growth of renewable energy 
projects, which use cleaner sources of energy,” “removing barriers to and 
promoting opportunities for renewable energy projects,” and “promoting a 
green economy.”33 The legislation streamlined the planning and environ-
mental approval processes for renewable energy projects, establishing a 
separate environmental assessment category, and transferring decision-
making authority from municipalities to the provincial government.34 Re-
newable energy projects in Ontario, beginning with wind turbines and 
eventually including solar farms, though broadly supported in principle 
across the province, were met with fierce resistance by local communities. 
This resistance was immediately branded as NIMBYism in policy circles, 
and seen as stemming from parochial concerns about the location of a 
proposed development within a given neighbourhood or community. From 
the perspective of policymakers, given that political support for invest-
ments in renewable energy was widespread in the province, localized op-
position was not principled, but rather narrow and selfish. Similarly, re-
newable energy advocates responded to the resistance with dismissal, 
treating it as irrational and self-interested, and seemed to steel them-
selves against it. They essentially approached such local resistance as a 
hurdle to surmount in the transition away from fossil fuels.35  
 In an important recent intervention, Karena Shaw and her collabora-
tors offer a more robust account of the resistance struggles.36 Relying up-
on a multi-investigator study of community responses to new energy de-
velopments in four Canadian provinces, they conclude that “resistance is 
heightened when communities are asked to relinquish certain landscape 
                                                  
32   Supra note 22. 
33   Ibid, Preamble. 
34  See ibid, s 5. See also O Reg 15/10 (designations re Section 5 of the Act). The Green 
Energy and Green Economy Act, which resulted in the enactment of the Green En-
ergy Act, 2009, was essentially omnibus legislation: its appendices modified sixteen 
other laws, including the Planning Act and the Environmental Protection Act, by 
creating exemptions to various requirements for projects designated as renewable 
energy projects (see David McRobert, Julian Tennent-Riddell & Chad Walker, “On-
tario’s Green Economy and Green Energy Act: Why a Well-Intentioned Law is 
Mired in Controversy and Opposed by Rural Communities” (2016) 7:2 Renewable 
Energy L & Policy Rev 91 at 91, n 1). 
35  For a description of this general dynamic, see e.g. Derek Bell et al, “Re-visiting the ‘So-
cial Gap’: Public Opinion and Relations of Power in the Local Politics of Wind Energy” 
(2013) 22:1 Environmental Politics 115. 
36   See Shaw et al, supra note 6. 
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values or uses—to make sacrifices—in the absence of an institutional in-
frastructure that they are confident will protect their interests and values 
over the long term.”37 The study identifies distributive justice as a key 
concern of local communities: “communities were concerned that they 
would bear often intensive social and ecological impacts of energy pro-
jects, while the benefits—the financial gains and new energy produced—
accrued elsewhere.”38 This focus on the “social patterning of costs and 
benefits”, according to the authors, is tied primarily to the ownership 
structure of the proposed project.39 As they state, “[t]he economic, govern-
ance, and regulatory arrangements underlying a project are important 
factors that create or undermine distributional justice, shaping who bene-
fits financially, who bears the risks, and how risks are managed.”40 
 In line with Shaw and her colleagues, we take the view that resistance 
to green energy projects should not be dismissed so easily. In fact, the an-
ti-wind and anti-solar movements that developed in southwestern Ontario 
present some challenging questions for environmental justice praxis. We 
organize these questions according to the different ways in which the peo-
ple we encountered on the ground articulated their concerns with new 
wind and solar projects. Accordingly, the presentation of claims by wind 
and solar farm resisters occurs in three ways: environmental health con-
cerns are advanced to contest the implementation of wind turbines 
(Part II-A); concerns articulated in language consistent with food justice 
critiques are levelled against solar farms based on the loss of arable land 
and their interference with Indigenous food sovereignty (Part II-B); and 
resistance to both wind and solar farms is articulated in the language of a 
loss of landscape values (Part II-C). We consider each of these claims in 
turn with a view to considering how critical environmental justice schol-
ars should receive, conceive of, and theorize this resistance. 
A. How Should We Receive Environmental Health Concerns? 
 Much of the resistance to wind turbines in southwestern Ontario is 
organized around a claim of adverse health effects, controversially termed 
“wind turbine syndrome”.41 We agree with Mark Winfield that any consid-
                                                  
37   Ibid at 42. 
38   Ibid at 46. 
39   Ibid at 43. 
40   Ibid. 
41   For a collection of materials regarding the health effects of wind turbines, see Wind 
Concerns Ontario, “Wind Energy and your Health” (2017), online: <www. 
windconcernsontario.ca/health/>. See also Nina Pierpont, Wind Turbine Syndrome: A 
Report on a Natural Experiment (Santa Fe: K-Selected Books, 2009). 
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eration of the potential adverse health effects associated with wind tur-
bines and other renewable energy projects should be undertaken in the 
context of the devastating and proven health effects associated with con-
ventional energy production, especially in relation to coal-fired utilities; 
we also believe, however, that an environmental justice analysis requires 
consideration of further distributional justice considerations.42 
 There are at least two ways of conceiving of the distribution of benefits 
and burdens. There is a question of the distribution of the environmental 
burdens associated with energy production, chiefly air pollution, and its 
associated health costs,43 as between communities affected by convention-
al energy generation, such as the coal-fired utilities phased out from 2002 
to 2014,44 and the communities affected by renewable energy projects in-
tended to replace the electricity they generated. On a very general level, it 
is possible to characterize the communities impacted by emissions from 
coal-fired utilities as relatively marginalized: they include communities 
such as Sarnia-Lambton and the Aamjiwnaang First Nation, the working-
class communities along Lake Erie, near the former Nanticoke generating 
station and U.S. Steel, Rainy River, and Thunder Bay. 
 Again, in very general terms, then, we are able to say that it was pri-
marily lower-income marginalized communities who disproportionately 
bore the environmental health effects of coal-fired utilities, whereas it is 
largely white middle-class property-owners who face the burdens associ-
ated with renewable energy projects. Taking the underlying environmen-
tal justice impulse to work toward a more equitable distribution of envi-
ronmental burdens across society, we may judge this to be a welcome shift 
                                                  
42  Mark Winfield states:  
Recent analyses attribute over 300 premature deaths per year in Ontario to 
air pollution from coal-fired electricity (down from 660 per year when coal 
use was at its height a few years ago). The upstream impacts and risks of 
coal mining, ranging from the occupational risks of underground mining to 
the destruction and consumption of entire landscapes via open-pit or moun-
taintop removal mining, must be considered as well.  
... [T]he biophysical impacts of wind turbines, for which the evidence in the 
formal literature is decidedly thin despite two decades of large-scale deploy-
ments in the densely populated landscapes of Western Europe, look rather 
less serious (Mark Winfield, “Ontario’s Green Energy Debate: Three Points to 
Consider” (10 March 2011), online: <marksw.blog.yorku.ca/blog/>). 
43  See generally Ontario Medial Association, The Illness Costs of Air Pollution in Ontario: 
A Summary of Finding (Toronto: Ontario Medical Association, 2000). 
44   For a discussion of lessons learned from Ontario’s experience phasing out coal, see In-
ternational Institute for Sustainable Development, “The End of Coal: Ontario’s Coal 
Phase-Out” by Melissa Harris, Marisa Beck & Ivetta Gerasimchuk (Winnipeg: IISD, 
2015), online: <www.iisd.org/>. 
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on a broad policy level.45 Environmental justice scholars, however, are al-
so concerned with a second way of conceiving the distributional question. 
Here, we consider the benefits and burdens associated with individual 
projects.46 We ask: Who benefits and who pays? And here, the difficulties 
associated with the wind and solar projects resurface, raising compelling 
questions about the ownership structures of the renewable energy pro-
jects, their impacts on local communities, and the degree of control local 
people maintain in relation to their environments. 
 In this part, we focus on the narratives that emerged in our interviews 
on the topic of adverse health effects associated with wind turbines. We 
share the narratives of affected residents neither to validate nor to adju-
dicate these claims, but rather to interrogate the way in which critical 
scholars receive them. We aim to develop a robust analytical approach to 
the burdens associated with individual renewable energy projects, in line 
with environmental justice frameworks. In particular, we strive to con-
front the striking similarities between the accounts of residents living 
near wind turbines and the standard narrative that emerges from the 
type of sacrifice zones more familiar to environmental justice communi-
ties, namely the downwinders: those fighting petrochemical or other fossil 
fuel developments or extraction. 
 In the case of wind turbine syndrome, the residents’ stories begin as 
most environmental justice stories do: with an exercise in popular epide-
miology.47 Affected residents whom we interviewed in Norfolk County 
stated that they experienced symptoms such as chronic headaches, sleep-
lessness, dizziness and loss of balance, tinnitus, vertigo, and migraines.48 
The residents uniformly described initially dealing with these symptoms 
themselves, then sharing their symptoms with family members, and final-
ly deciding to reveal their symptoms to neighbours and the broader com-
munity. The process of sharing these experiences began with informal 
                                                  
45  This is admittedly an oversimplification. As Iris Marion Young famously notes, “[I]t is a 
mistake to reduce social justice to distribution” (Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Pol-
itics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990 at 15). See also Da-
vid Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Movements, and Nature (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 103–28. 
46   For this reason, we often hear about “community benefits” being offered to increase 
public acceptance in facility-siting disputes. The trouble with renewable energy pro-
jects, of course, is that the benefits—in the form of climate change mitigation—accrue 
globally, while the impacts are concentrated locally (see Richard Cowell, Gill Bristow & 
Max Munday, “Acceptance, Acceptability and Environmental Justice: The Role of 
Community Benefits in Wind Energy Development” (2011) 54:4 J Environmental Plan-
ning & Management 539 at 539–40). 
47   See generally Scott, “Monitors Now”, supra note 15. 
48  See Interviewees no 4 (28 July 2015), no 2 (27 July 2015), no 1 (27 July 2015).  
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conversations with neighbours, and progressed to a comparing of symp-
toms and an attempt to construct a causal narrative based on considera-
tions such as distance from a turbine, wind direction, geography, and ma-
terials used in house construction.49 
 For example, when asked how she came to believe that the turbines 
were affecting her health, one resident stated:  
It was when all eighteen turbines ... started turning at the same 
time. I remember because it happened to be my son’s birthday ... and 
over the next week or so ... my head felt like a block of concrete, my 
ears were stuffed, and right now, I [can]not hear everything you’re 
saying because my ears are stuffed. And I know that the wind has 
been from the southeast and those are days when I’m grateful be-
cause when the winds [come] from the southeast or the south or 
even the southwest, the turbulence all goes to the community on the 
north side of the turbines. So for a little moment, or half a day or so, 
I feel just a little bit better. When the winds are from the west and 
you get all the turbines [going], it’s really very, very debilitating.50  
When the resident was asked how long it took her to decide that the 
health effects were related to the turbines, she replied, 
No more than a couple of weeks. I went to my neighbour ... and ... 
when the wind was from the northwest, he used to get pain in the 
back of his neck, and we started comparing notes, and then we real-
ized that when the wind turbines weren’t turning, all of these symp-
toms disappeared.51 
When asked if she was recording her symptoms, the resident replied, “I 
did do a little bit of a diary that I started in March 2010.”52 Relating how 
she was forced to rent an apartment away from her home to escape the 
turbines, she continued:  
So that was an experiment that [X]’s mom and one of our other 
neighbour’s, [Y], who lived down the road a little further [did]. We 
rented an apartment in [Z], which is forty-five kilometres from here 
... so I was doing a crossover-type of experiment—I knew what I was 
doing, but I wasn’t going to sort of cave in and be a recorder of my 
own demise.53  
 Another resident explained:  
Eventually, you start to gain some familiarity with the sound and 
maybe your ears are tuning in to a lower frequency sound and you’re 
                                                  
49   See ibid. 
50   Interviewee no 1, supra note 48. 
51   Ibid. 
52   Ibid. 
53   Ibid. 
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saying, “[are] my bones vibrating, what’s going on here?” And then 
at some point, it’s like ... it’s very obvious that the wind turbines are 
the cause. And when I started to feel resonance in my body ... some 
nights are much worse than others ... I have to get up to go to work 
in the morning and it’s [one in the morning] and I can’t sleep and my 
body’s vibrating and I can hear them. It’s an emergency, a crisis ... 
[and] we don’t have six years to argue this out as we figure [it] out.54  
Yet another resident reported: 
My husband’s tinnitus has gotten much worse; he has it a lot more 
often and a lot more severe, too. So he wakes up in the middle of the 
night and can’t get back to sleep, and he’s up and down and then it 
rings throughout the day lots of times too. It always seems to be 
when the wind is up and the wind turbines are going faster.55 
When asked why they think the turbines are not affecting everyone in the 
community, one resident replied: “Number one, I feel like there may be a 
lot of denial.”56 Other community members indicated that they thought 
families who had signed contracts with the wind companies were not in a 
position to admit that they were sick, due to confidentiality clauses. 
 As residents struggled to make sense of these symptoms, they de-
scribed multiple neighbours along the same road experiencing vertigo for 
the first time.57 They collected stories of others across the county experi-
encing heart palpitations, nausea, migraines, trouble sleeping, and “feel-
ing vibrations”. Multiple residents told us that the ringing in their ears 
disappeared when they left their homes and communities, and returned 
when they came back. One resident recounted:  
My youngest daughter ... we had to keep her out of school, some-
thing was wrong with her, she felt dizzy and faint; her legs and arms 
were numb, she said she had a bad headache, was nauseated. Later 
that night, and right through the next day, I heard and felt the noise 
and vibrations from the wind turbines more prominently than usu-
al.58  
 When compared with the serious environmental health effects which 
often arise from living in the vicinity of a petrochemical complex or down-
stream of a major oil or gas development—such as cancers, reproductive 
and developmental disorders, and chronic respiratory illness—the health 
complaints of residents in southwestern Ontario may seem relatively mi-
nor. It is clear that adverse health effects associated with wind turbines 
                                                  
54   Interviewee no 4, supra note 48. 
55   Interviewee no 2, supra note 48.  
56   Interviewee no 1, supra note 48.  
57   See Interviewee no 2, supra note 48. 
58   Interviewee no 4, supra note 48. 
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are not uniformly experienced. For the residents who experience them, 
however, they are described as completely “life-changing” and “debilitat-
ing”, disrupting work, family life, and relationships.59 Further, while they 
may differ slightly in kind, the pattern by which they emerge follows a 
formula that environmental justice scholars will find familiar.60 
 Consider the early grassroots struggles that are largely credited for 
giving rise to the environmental justice movement in the United States: 
the clusters of illness which were finally tied to the underground plumes 
of toxic contamination in Love Canal, New York, in the early 1970s, were 
first brought to light by Lois Gibbs and the other now-celebrated “house-
wives” who walked up and down streets to gather data like this.61 The 
largely Black community of Warren County, North Carolina took up these 
methods in their bid to demonstrate the link between their children’s ill-
nesses and the toxic waste dumped along their roadways in the early 
1980s.62 The pattern repeats in Canada: along Fredrick Street in the Syd-
ney Tar Ponds on Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia,63 on the Aamjiwnaang 
First Nation reserve adjacent to Canada’s Chemical Valley,64 and on 
Township Road 842, downwind of the Peace River oil sands.65 As Jason 
Corburn demonstrates in Street Science, a common element to these sto-
ries is that evidence collected through exercises in popular epidemiology is 
initially discounted and rejected by formal scientific and legal authorities. 
 In many of these struggles, however, the popular account is subse-
quently validated. The point is that environmental justice activists are 
quite familiar with legal and regulatory decision-making processes dis-
counting “evidence that is more informal, experiential, tacit, and explicitly 
value laden.”66 In fact, the thrust of much environmental justice scholar-
                                                  
59   Ibid; Interviewee no 1, supra note 48. 
60   Steve Lerner describes the process through which residents become activists in his 
book, Sacrifice Zones: The Front Lines of Toxic Chemical Exposure in the United States 
(see Lerner, supra note 2 at 2–6). 
61  See Jason Corburn, Street Science: Community Knowledge and Environmental Health 
Justice (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005) at 34–35; Amy M Hay, “Recipe for Disas-
ter: Motherhood and Citizenship at Love Canal” (2009) 21:1 J Women’s History 111 
at 114–26. 
62   See Phil Brown & Edwin J Mikkelsen, No Safe Place: Toxic Waste, Leukemia, and 
Community Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) at 71. 
63   See Maude Barlow & Elizabeth May, Frederick Street: Life and Death on Canada’s Love 
Canal (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2000) at 114–46. 
64   See Scott, “Monitors Now”, supra note 15 at 265–67; Sarah Marie Wiebe, Everyday Ex-
posure: Indigenous Mobilization and Environmental Justice in Canada’s Chemical Val-
ley (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016) at 97–124. 
65   See Scott, “Monitors Now”, supra note 15 at 267–69, 277–78. 
66   Corburn, supra note 61 at 27. 
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ship has been to explicitly counter this dynamic, recognizing that it is 
fuelled by the tactics of “manufactured uncertainty” employed by “big to-
bacco”, “big chem”, and “big oil” over the years, largely undertaken with 
the aim of delaying regulatory restrictions on their products.67  
 In contrast, Luke Cole and Sheila Foster’s ground-breaking work on 
the environmental justice movement, From the Ground Up, forcefully ar-
gues that affected residents must “speak for themselves”, their expertise 
must be valued, and they must be believed.68 The notion of “popular epi-
demiology” is based on the idea of these residents talking to their neigh-
bours, comparing symptoms, and compiling notes.69 When individuals 
come together to challenge a development in their community, typically 
put forward by outsiders—in this case, by renewable energy multination-
als perceived to be trying to buy off landowners one by one with secretive 
contracts preventing them from speaking out70—a key question for critical 
environmental justice scholars must be: How should we receive these 
claims? 
 Should our attitude towards the claims be based primarily on the 
characteristics of the residents complaining (i.e., asking whether they are 
marginalized, racialized, or oppressed). Or does the critique, which we 
have developed through our analyses of how data, power, and authority 
are mutually constituted in environmental justice struggles, instead 
command us to approach all “truth claims” differently, regardless of 
whether the mobilizing residents are (as they are in this case) largely 
white, middle-class property-owners? Does this critique require us to see 
those claims as “situated and contingent”,71 coming from a community of 
knowers with shared beliefs and experiences, and as having a basic validi-
ty, even though they are not grounded in conventional scientific 
knowledge?  
 As is perhaps not surprising, tribunals in Ontario and state institu-
tions across Canada have not received the claims in this way. Instead, 
                                                  
67   See generally David Michaels, “Manufactured Uncertainty: Protecting Public Health in 
the Age of Contested Science and Product Defense” (2006) 1076 Annals NY Academy 
Sciences 149. 
68  Luke W Cole & Sheila R Foster, From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism and the 
Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement (New York: New York University Press, 
2001) at 106. 
69  See Brown, “Ways of Knowing”, supra note 11 at 267–68. See also Scott, “Monitors 
Now”, supra note 15 at 262–63, 265–66.  
70   See Interviewee no 1, supra note 48. See also Dave Seglins, “Ont. Couple Seeks Injunc-
tion to Stop Wind-Farm Expansion”, CBC News (11 September 2012), online: <www. 
cbc.ca>. 
71   See Scott, “Monitors Now”, supra note 15 at 262–63, 278.  
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they have dismissed the adverse health claims framed in terms of wind 
turbine syndrome on the basis of a lack of credible evidence.72 In a recent 
report, Ontario’s Chief Medical Officer of Health concluded, “[T]he scien-
tific evidence available to date does not demonstrate a direct causal link 
between wind turbine noise and adverse health effects.”73 Ontario’s Envi-
ronmental Review Tribunal heard a series of cases related to health con-
cerns associated with wind turbines between about 2011 and 2015, and 
uniformly rejected claims of adverse health effects.74 In Drennan v. Ontar-
io (Ministry of the Environment) (the “K2 wind decision”), the tribunal 
stated: 
[T]he Appellants did not provide professional medical opinions to di-
agnose the health complaints from the post-turbine witnesses and to 
establish a causal link between those complaints and wind turbines 
noise or noise from transformers. As importantly, the Tribunal has 
the benefit of the testimony of Drs. Mundt, McCunney and Moore 
that reinforce previous Tribunal findings that the post-turbine wit-
nesses need to be properly diagnosed by a medical professional and 
that there is no reliable evidence to demonstrate that the Project will 
cause serious physical or any other serious harm.75 
 Many of those cases closely followed an authoritative study on the 
health effects of wind turbine exposure from Health Canada released in 
2014.76 This study found no evidence to support a link between exposure 
to wind turbine noise and any of the self-reported illnesses (e.g., dizziness, 
tinnitus, and migraines) and chronic conditions (e.g., heart disease, high 
blood pressure, and diabetes) and no association between multiple 
measures of stress (e.g., hair cortisol, blood pressure, heart rate, and dis-
rupted sleep) and exposure to wind turbine noise.77 On the topic of “an-
                                                  
72   The appeal of the renewable energy approvals issued for three wind turbine projects in 
Ontario—the St. Columban wind project, the K2 wind project, and the Armow wind 
project—were heard together at the Environmental Review Tribunal, and all three ap-
peals were dismissed (see Dixon v Director, Ministry of the Environment (2014), 85 
CELR (3d) 153) (Ont ERT)). The Environmental Review Tribunal’s decision was af-
firmed in Dixon v Director, Ministry of the Environment, 2014 ONSC 7404 (Div Ct), 92 
CELR (3d) 290, with additional reasons reported at Dixon v Ontario (Director, Ministry 
of the Environment), 2015 ONSC 1358 (Div Ct), 92 CELR (3d) 355. 
73   Ontario, Chief Medical Officer of Health, “The Potential Health Impact of Wind Tur-
bines” (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2010) at 3. 
74   See supra, note 72. 
75   Drennan v Ontario (Ministry of the Environment) (2014), 85 CELR (3d) 57 at para 213, 
2014 CarswellOnt 1695 (WL Can) (Ont ERT) [emphasis added].  
76   See Health Canada, Environmental and Workplace Health, “Wind Turbine Noise and 
Health Study: Summary of Results” (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2014), online: <www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/>.  
77   See ibid. 
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noyance levels”, perhaps unsurprisingly, statistically significant relation-
ships were found between increasing wind turbine noise and the preva-
lence of reporting high annoyance.78 These associations were found with 
annoyance due to noise, vibrations, blinking lights, shadows, and visual 
impacts from wind turbines. Interestingly, however, annoyance was said 
to be significantly lower among the 110 participants who received person-
al direct or indirect benefits of having wind turbines in the area.79  
 All of this leads some critics to argue that Ontario simply made mis-
takes in its implementation of the Green Energy Act, 2009. As an advocate 
for Wind Concerns Ontario stated: “Wind power can work ... but plunking 
[turbines] down, right next to communities and next to homes and 
schools, is not the right idea.”80 For these people, siting was the crucial 
thing that went wrong. For others, the failure to reimagine ownership 
structures and obtain community buy-in was the problem.81 This is where 
the “annoyance level” findings are interesting. On this kind of environ-
mental justice framing of distributive justice, it is that the risks and costs 
are falling on residents and the benefits are all accruing somewhere else 
that is crucial. Think of the anti-pipeline slogan, “All Risk, No Reward.”82 
When residents sense this, they fight it—and the fact that the project will 
produce energy that is ‘renewable’ seems to do little to mitigate these sen-
timents. 
B. How Should We Handle the Competing Claims to Land? 
 A second theme was observed primarily in the resistance to solar 
farms. How should we adjudicate claims to land as between those who 
want to preserve it for food production (broadly construed) and those who 
would use it for solar power generation? From an environmental justice 
framework, we are familiar with conflicts over land and space as they typ-
ically play out between industrial and residential uses, or even sometimes 
between “green space” and “industrial development”. We have less experi-
                                                  
78   See ibid. 
79   See ibid.  
80   Chip Martin, “This Blows: Growing List of Ontario Municipalities Declare ‘Unwilling 
Hosts’ to Wind Turbines”, The London Free Press (16 August 2013), online: <www. 
lfpress.com>. 
81 See Interviewee no 6 (29 July 2015, Haldimand County). See also Stewart Fast & 
Warren Mabee, “Place-making and Trust-building: The Influence of Policy on Host 
Community Responses to Wind Farms” (2015) 81 Energy Policy 27; Chad Walker & 
Jamie Baxter, “‘It’s Easy to Throw Rocks at a Corporation’: Wind Energy Develop-
ment and Distributive Justice in Canada”, online: (2017) J Environmental Policy & 
Planning 1 <dx.doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2016.1267614>. 
82   See All Risk No Rewards, All Risk No Reward, online: <allrisknoreward.com>.  
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ence and analysis addressing competing demands framed in “justice” 
terms. 
  Communities across Ontario experienced a “solar building boom” in 
the summer of 2014.83 Credit has been directed at supportive provincial 
policies, in particular the Feed-In Tariff Program launched in conjunction 
with the Green Energy Act, 2009, which offered high, fixed prices for elec-
tricity generated from large-scale solar projects and other renewable 
sources.84 Although aspects of the program have now been discontinued, it 
produced more than seventy “huge, ground-level projects, sometimes cov-
ering vast tracts of land.”85 Proponents rave about the uncontroversial na-
ture of solar generation. According to a small-town mayor, “Solar does 
[not] present the same kind of issues as wind.”86 And as an industry con-
sultant claims, “It sits there, it’s quiet, and it is not very visible because it 
is flat on the ground.”87 But other commentators concede that there are 
“legitimate concerns from residents who live near planned solar farms,” 
pointing to “the hum from inverters, the glare from panels, and worries 
over water, wildlife and the loss of farmland.”88 These concerns are widely 
regarded as “remedied” through more recent interventions, including 
larger setbacks of panels from roadways, waterways, property lines, and 
the like, as well as the provincial government’s prohibition of the installa-
tion of solar farms on high-quality farm lands.89  
                                                  
83   Richard Blackwell, “Solar Power Surging to Forefront of Canadian Energy”, The Globe 
and Mail (26 July 2014), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com> [Blackwell, “Solar Pow-
er”]. See also Richard Blackwell, “Going Green: Does Ontario’s Energy Shift Have the 
Power to Sustain Itself?”, The Globe and Mail (10 July 2015), online: <www. 
globeandmail.com>. 
84   See Green Energy Act, 2009, supra note 22, Preamble, ss 5, 11. See also IESO, “Feed-in 
Tariff Program”, supra note 22.  
85   While the cancellation of the Large Renewable Procurement program was announced in 
September 2016, the FIT and microFIT programs remain in place (see Ontario, 
Ministry of Energy, News Release, “Ontario Suspends Large Renewable Energy 
Procurement” (27 September 2016), online: Government of Ontario Newsroom <news. 
ontario.ca> [Ontario, “Ontario Suspends Procurement”]). See also Independent 
Electricity Service Operator, “Feed-in Tariff Program” (19 December 2016), online: 
IESO <www.ieso.ca/sector-participants/feed-in-tariff-program/news-and-updates/fit-5-
application-summary>). 
86   Blackwell, “Solar Power”, supra note 83. 
87   Ibid. 
88   Ibid. 
89   Ibid. But see Konrad Yakabuski, “The Darker Side of Solar Power”, Editorial, The 
Globe and Mail (27 May 2015), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com> (“[t]he industry 
doesn’t talk much, or at all, about the downsides of manufacturing solar panels or 
where all these panels will end up when they conk out. Think of how much toxic waste 
is generated by consumer electronics and you get a small inkling of what a world lit 
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 In exploring the more trenchant criticisms of large-scale solar projects 
in our qualitative research, we found that resistance to solar farms in 
southwestern Ontario was often grounded in concerns about the use of 
arable lands for purposes other than growing food and serving environ-
mental and ecological functions. Certain articulations of these concerns 
appear consistent with “food justice” activism as it has been mounted by 
farmers and growers. In an interview, a former farmer articulated “a 
philosophical objection to using solar generation on crop land.”90 While 
acknowledging that “wind has been very controversial in the County,” he 
noted that “[t]hrough our Federation of Agriculture, we have consistently 
objected to using farm land for solar panels.” Going on to state that he 
could not “see any reason why they would need to bulldoze [farm fields] 
into a sterile expanse of soil,” he added: 
[M]arginal land is not useless land. Even if it’s marginal land, ... it 
performs a very useful environmental function. There’s no such 
thing as useless land. ... We must be very concerned about what we 
do ... in terms of changing the landscape from a natural environ-
ment, whether it’s for farming purposes or environmental reasons, 
ya know. Both are legitimate led uses to be sure.91 
As another resident commented,  
[W]hen you bring a solar installation into a rural area, you basically 
destroy that soil. You destroy it, because they will dig down, they 
will dig up all the topsoil, they will put three feet of heavy gauge 
gravel, and you just can’t re-build that. ... They were offering ridicu-
lous prices to take advantage of some of these wide open spaces with 
southern exposure like we have here, and I think the [Ontario Min-
istry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs] put the kibosh on that 
pretty quick. They said, “Oh no no. You can’t come down here and 
destroy class I, II, and III soils. You’ll have to make a case that the 
land is good for nothing, it’s totally marginal. Even then, it’s dis-
couraged because the [Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry] 
and conservation groups, environmental groups, would like to see 
that kind of land returned to nature, wildlife, pollinator habitat, 
[and] reforestation.92 
      
with solar power, and the batteries needed to store their energy, might look like”). For a 
response, see Merran Smith, “Solar Power Isn’t Perfect, But It’s the Best We’ve Got”, 
The Huffington Post Canada (31 May 2015), online: <www.huffingtonpost.ca> 
(“[s]omething has to keep the lights on, and there’s simply no such thing as a clean, re-
liable, cost-effective—and 100-percent pollution-free—electricity source. It doesn’t exist. 
This rule applies whether you’re considering fossil fuels, nuclear, or renewable energy. 
Like many things in this world, power generation is a game of finding the best option, 
warts and all”). 
90   Interviewee no 6, supra note 81. 
91   Ibid. 
92   Interviewee no 5 (28 July 2015, Norfolk County). 
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In contrast to wind farms, which “take very little land out of production,” 
the retired farmer decried the use of arable land for solar generation and 
the stronger protection afforded to “wood lands” over agricultural lands. 
In his words,  
If we look at the development of solar farms in [the] county, wood 
lots are protected. Farm land is on a lower scale than wood lands 
[laughs]. That shows you where our priorities are as a society. We 
take our food for granted, but we protect our [laughs] environment 
before we protect our food producing resources.93  
These arguments have resonances with the Farmers Feed Cities cam-
paign, another prominent example of farmer-land food justice. Launched 
in 2005, and ultimately stewarded by the Grain Farmers of Ontario, the 
lobbying front and consumer awareness campaign sought to build support 
for the plight of farmers across the province. In the form of lawn signs, 
bumper stickers and window decals, and backed by farmers’ political pro-
tests and convergences, the campaign portrayed farmers in heroic fashion 
to urban dwellers in a period of heightened interest in the development of 
“local” and “sustainable” food initiatives. Yet, the campaign reinforced cer-
tain misconceptions about the shifting nature of farming practices. Those 
misconceptions often invoke, as one resident put it, the  
classic Old-MacDonald family farm, where there’s a diversity of 
things done on the farm. There’s a lot of people who have this per-
ception that that’s the way agriculture is still done in southern On-
tario, and it’s not. I mean, agriculture now is very much done on an 
industrial scale, in a sophisticated fashion.94 
 Indeed, the Farmers Feed Cities campaign glossed over many issues of 
contemporary importance in southwestern Ontario. The campaign said 
little about agro-food consolidation and integration into corporate supply 
chains (indeed, in a certain respect, it celebrated this); the injustices of 
hunger and starvation in cities;95 the gendered nature of food provisioning 
                                                  
93   Ibid. In questioning Ontario’s green energy policy, the farmer argued that “[if] people 
were serious about solar energy, I think our government would dictate or refuse to issue 
a building permit unless there was a solar component on the roof. But don’t look to farm 
land and cover it with solar panels.” “[S]olar is great provided it is integrated within the 
existing urban infrastructure” (ibid).  
94   Ibid. 
95  On global restructuring of the agro-food industry, see generally Philip McMichael, ed, 
The Global Restructuring of Agro-Food Systems (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1994). Food sovereignty and Via Campesina have emerged as an alternative to corpo-
rate consolidation (see Annette Aurélie Desmarais, La Vía Campesina: Globalization 
and the Power of Peasants (Halifax: Fernwood, 2007)). See also Nik Heynen, “Justice of 
Eating in the City: The Political Ecology of Urban Hunger” in Nik Heynen, Marie Kaika 
& Erik Swyngedouw, eds, In the Nature of Cities: Urban Political Ecology and the Poli-
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and social reproduction;96 white privilege and racism in agro-food produc-
tion, provisioning, and planning;97 the “battle fields” of migrant agricul-
tural labour and growers;98 wider ecological injustices, whether caused by 
fossil fuel dependency in inputs and greenhouse gas outputs, monocultur-
al crop production, soil erosion, aquifer depletion, or a combination of 
these; or food sovereignty at the intersections of settler colonialism and 
capitalist imperialism.99 As these considerations suggest, alternatives to 
narrowly conceived farmer-centred conceptions of food justice exist. 
 As an example, in our research we also encountered resistance to re-
newable energy projects articulated in the language of Indigenous rights 
and food sovereignty. In particular, members of the Six Nations of the 
Grand River expressed concerns surrounding the possible violation of 
their hunting rights caused by the disruption of wildlife habitat and mi-
gration routes, which would result from plans to build a vast solar instal-
lation on their traditional territory.100 “No one on this tribunal will be liv-
      
tics of Urban Metabolism (London: Routledge, 2006) 129; Nik Heynen, Hilda E Kurtz & 
Amy Trauger, “Food Justice, Hunger and the City” (2012) 6:5 Geography Compass 304. 
96   See Susan Braedley & Meg Luxton, “Competing Philosophies: Neoliberalism and Chal-
lenges of Everyday Life” in Susan Braedley & Meg Luxton, eds, Neoliberalism and Eve-
ryday Life (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010) 3 at 14. On social repro-
duction more broadly, see generally Kate Bezanson & Meg Luxton, eds, Social Repro-
duction: Feminist Political Economy Challenges Neo-Liberalism (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2006). 
97   See Alfonso Morales, “Growing Food and Justice: Dismantling Racism through Sus-
tainable Food Systems” in Alison Hope Alkon & Julian Agyeman, eds, Cultivating Food 
Justice: Race, Class, and Sustainability (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2011) 149; Ra-
chel Slocum, “Anti-Racist Practice and the Work of Community Food Organizations” 
(2006) 38:2 Antipode 327; Julie Guthman, “‘If They Only Knew’: The Unbearable 
Whiteness of Alternative Food” in Alkon & Agyeman, supra note 97, 263; Rachel Slo-
cum, “Whiteness, Space and Alternative Food Practice” (2007) 38:3 Geoforum 520. 
98   See Don Mitchell, “Battle/Fields: Braceros, Agribusiness, and the Violent Reproduction 
of the California Agricultural Landscape During World War II” (2010) 36:2 J Historical 
Geography 143. See also “Migrant Farm Workers: Fields of Tears”, The Economist (16 
December 2010), online: <www.economist.com>. 
99   See Annette Aurélie Desmarais & Hannah Wittman, “Farmers, Foodies and First Na-
tions: Getting to Food Sovereignty in Canada” (2014) 41:6 J Peasant Studies 1153; Eric 
Holt-Giménez, “Food Security, Food Justice, or Food Sovereignty? Crises, Food Move-
ments, and Regime Change” in Alkon & Agyeman, supra note 97, 309. 
100  The Six Nations Elected Council entered into a partnership with Samsung Renewables 
for the construction of the Grand Renewable Energy Park in Ontario (see John Spears, 
“Six Nations Reach Energy Deal with Samsung”, Toronto Star (1 June 2012), online: 
<www.thestar.com>). For a description of the project, see Stantec Consulting Ltd, 
Grand Renewable Energy Park: Project Description Report (Guelf: Stantec, 2011), 
online: <www.samsungrenewableenergy.ca>. For other projects planned in the area, see 
Michael-Allan Marion, “Six Nations Finalizes Wind Energy Projects”, Brantford Exposi-
tor (9 April 2014), online: <www.brantfordexpositor.ca>. 
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ing on this land. No one will know the effects until 40 years from now,” 
stated a Six Nations band member who gave evidence at an Environmen-
tal Review Tribunal hearing on the Samsung Grand Renewable Energy 
Park.101 Members of the band engaged in resistance actions such as put-
ting up “no trespassing” signs on the land and uprooting surveying stakes 
installed by the renewable energy giant, Samsung. Another resident ex-
plained: “I have no respect for Samsung. They have no respect for the 
wildlife. All they care about is the money. ... It’s pretty sad that we would 
give up our children’s rights for a dollar.”102 
 The concerns expressed to us by the Indigenous community members 
we interviewed emphasized that Six Nations people live and rely heavily 
on the land.103 The presence of the wildlife on the territory is critical to the 
continuation of their traditional practices, to their ability to transfer those 
skills and values to the next generations, and to their own food needs.104 
Residents indicated that they were trying to “bring that attention to the 
connection to the land, the medicines,” so that they could fulfill responsi-
bilities to “take care of those animals that we are relatives of.”105 But 
these community members were frustrated that in the tribunal process, 
they were unable to meet the demands for certain types of “knowledge” 
and “expertise” that would be valued by the decision makers. As one resi-
dent put it,  
We were supposed to be able to put forward the effects that these 
windmills and solar panels would have on the environment. ... [T]he 
thing that we found out is that we don’t have the education to back 
that up; however, we do have a cultural component and heritage and 
ceremonies. ... So we have a different understanding from what they 
have. Our understanding has more of a spiritual aspect. The down-
side is we weren’t allowed to use our wampums, we weren’t allowed 
to use our treaties, to use our laws. ... [I]t was all based on what the 
negative effects would be if those [projects] went up. And they’re not 
up and they’re still fairly new, so how can anybody really prove 
that?106 
 Critical scholars have built on the close affinities between food justice 
and environmental justice to posit nuanced accounts that can incorporate 
                                                  
101  Jennifer Vo, “I Have No Respect for Samsung. They Have No Respect for the Wildlife. 
All They Care About Is the Money” (11 November 2012), Ontario Wind Resistance, 
online: <ontario-wind-resistance.org>.  
102 Ibid.  
103  See Interviewee no 8 (28 July 2015, Six Nations); Interviewee no 9 (9 August 2014, Six 
Nations). 
104  See Interviewee no 8, supra note 103.  
105  Ibid. 
106  Ibid. 
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these tensions.107 Carmen Gonzalez adopts a “tripartite definition of food 
justice consisting of ecologically sustainable food production, equitable ac-
cess to food and food-producing resources, and democratic local and na-
tional control over food and agricultural policy.”108 Food justice in this con-
ception aims to secure “the right of communities to grow, sell, and con-
sume healthy, nutritious, affordable, and culturally appropriate food pro-
duced through ecologically sustainable methods, and their right to demo-
cratically determine their own food and agriculture policies.”109 The refer-
ence to Indigenous law made by the Six Nations’ resident above highlights 
its ongoing subordination to the colonial laws applied by courts and tribu-
nals, and thus underscores the complexity in notions of food justice which 
take the elements of culture and self-determination seriously. The articu-
lation of resistance to solar farms in southwestern Ontario thus mobilizes 
concerns which expose valid questions and serious tensions between envi-
ronmental justice, energy justice, and food justice, broadly conceived. To 
dismiss such concerns as NIMBYism is to dodge the difficult questions 
which critical scholars will need to confront in analyzing the resistance to 
the transition from fossil fuels.  
C. How Should We Think about the “Right to Landscape”?  
 Finally, and perhaps most profoundly, we encountered green energy 
resistance framed in terms of a right to the landscape. This third type of 
claim involves the defence of landscape values as residents articulate a 
connection to land and an affection for a landscape seen as “theirs by 
right”. Whereas the charge of NIMBYism is commonly (and perhaps most 
easily) launched when opposition to renewable energy projects is based on 
                                                  
107  See Alison Hope Alkon & Julian Agyeman, “Introduction: The Food Movement as Poly-
culture” in Alkon & Agyeman, supra note 97, 1 (noting that contemporary food justice 
has its origins in the environmental justice movement). See also Teresa M Mares & 
Devon G Peña, “Environmental and Food Justice: Toward Local, Slow, and Deep Food 
Systems” in Alkon & Agyeman, supra note 99, 197; Patricia Allen, “Mining for Justice 
in the Food System: Perceptions, Practices, and Possibilities” (2008) 25:2 Agriculture & 
Human Values 157; Joshua Sbicca, “Growing Food Justice by Planting an Anti-
Oppression Foundation: Opportunities and Obstacles for a Budding Social Movement” 
(2012) 29:4 Agriculture & Human Values 455; Alison Hope Alkon & Kari Marie Nor-
gaard, “Breaking the Food Chains: An Investigation of Food Justice Activism” (2009) 
79:3 Sociological Inquiry 289. 
108  Carmen G Gonzalez, “Food Justice: An Environmental Justice Critique of the Global 
Food System” in Shawkat Alam et al, eds, International Environmental Law and the 
Global South (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 401 at 402. 
109  Ibid at 404 [footnote omitted]. For Gonzalez, “the demand for food justice is ultimately a 
call for the vesting of the right to development and the right to permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources in peoples rather than states” (ibid at 433 [emphasis in origi-
nal]). See also Alkon & Agyeman, supra note 97.  
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aesthetic concerns, it is possible to instead situate these articulations 
within the emerging idea of a “right to landscape”.110 The European Un-
ion’s 2000 European Landscape Convention111 and UNESCO’s 2012 Flor-
ence Declaration on Landscape112 demonstrate heightened concern for 
landscape degradation and a contemporary push for the safeguard of 
landscapes. In these accounts, landscape pertains to “the expression of the 
relationship between people and environment” with a recognition of 
“landscape [as] a common good” and “the right to the landscape [as] a 
human necessity.”113 That said, there has been very little work on the 
right to landscape situated within wider concerns about “just transi-
tion”114 and global environmental or climate justice.115 
 To be sure, a core dimension of the residents’ landscape claims turns 
on the perceived aesthetic impact of renewable energy projects. In the 
words of one resident,  
[Solar farms are] hideous. [The solar companies] are not doing any-
thing to buffer them visually. And people are asking, ‘what are you 
doing to our beautiful county?’ No, we’re not going to stand for this. 
And to a lesser extent there’s that same feeling with regard to indus-
trial wind turbines. They’re a blight on the landscape – that’s how 
people feel.116 
 As the resident continued, 
It’s that people down here—what we see with respect to our land-
scape—find the solar installations really ugly and intrusive. Like I 
said, they go in, and they just totally scarify a gigantic piece of land 
                                                  
110  See generally Shelley Egoz, Jala Makhzoumi & Gloria Pungetti, eds, The Right to 
Landscape: Contesting Landscape and Human Rights (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011). 
111  Council of Europe, European Landscape Convention, 20 October 2000, Eur TS No 176 
(entered into force 4 January 2004).  
112  UNESCO, Final Declaration of the UNESCO International meeting on ‘The Interna-
tional Protection of Landscapes’, Florence Declaration on Landscape, 2012, (September 
2012), online: UNESCO <whc.unesco.org/document/123336>. 
113  Ibid, Preamble. See also European Landscape Convention, supra note 111, Preamble. 
114  “Just transition” is a phrase that is used in political discourse as shorthand for the idea 
that the transition to a lower carbon future should be attentive to issues of equity for 
those whose livelihoods dependent on a fossil fuel economy (see generally Peter Newell 
& Justin Mulvaney, “The Political Economy of the ‘Just Transition’” (2013) 179:2 Geo-
graphical J 132). 
115  For a discussion of global environmental justice, see generally Joan Martinez-Alier et 
al, “Is There a Global Environmental Justice Movement?” (2016) 43:3 J Peasant Studies 
731; Dan van der Horst & Saskia Vermeylen, “Local Rights to Landscape in the Global 
Moral Economy of Carbon” (2011) 36:4 Landscape Research 455; Dan van der Horst & 
Saskia Vermeylen, “Ownership Claims, Valuation Practices, and the Unpacking of En-
ergy-Landscape Conflicts” (2012) 22:3 Intl Rev Sociology 429. 
116  Interviewee no 5, supra note 92. 
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and they dig up all the topsoil and they put down all this gravel and 
then they throw down these black panels and they all have a giant 
fence around them with razor wire on the top. We have beautiful 
countryside down here, there’s resistance to that.117 
But the resistance to green energy projects we encountered in southwest-
ern Ontario raises questions more fundamental than mere concerns about 
aesthetics. How should we receive claims by residents that renewable en-
ergy projects are interfering with the landscape, when those people articu-
late a profound connection to and affection for a particular landscape?  
 When perceived as a “right to landscape”, articulations of a severed 
connection to a valued landscape may incorporate, to varying degrees, en-
trenched notions of private property. In this respect, “[q]uestions of prop-
erty are questions related to who can—and cannot—make legitimate 
claims to occupy, appropriate, or alienate landscapes.”118 These notions 
are present in a response from a resident who noted that “land owner-
ship—it’s a touchy subject for a lot of farmers. Ya know they identify with 
the ownership of their land. In many cases [it’s] their retirement funds.”119 
Yet, the lament for the loss of a landscape can also have the potential of 
affirming the attachments of “non-owners” to land and for extending 
rights to a collective that may even challenge contemporary capitalist 
commitments to what is possible on a landscape.120 It is in this context 
that we might receive the same resident’s remarks that “the attachment 
to a land holding is not nearly as pronounced as it was, even a generation 
ago.”121 
 Here, we might also consider the perspectives which address how 
landscape intersects with everyday social life. Attentive to the naturaliza-
tion of social relations through landscape, critical geographers have fo-
cused on landscape’s encoding of meaning, relations, practices, and histo-
ries. These accounts view landscape as “driven by real people and their ef-
                                                  
117  Ibid.  
118  Gunhild Setten & Katrina Myrvang Brown, “Landscape and Social Justice” in Peter 
Howard, Ian Thompson & Emma Waterton, eds, The Routledge Companion to Land-
scape Studies (London: Routledge, 2013) 243 at 250. See also Frode Flemsæter, Gunhild 
Setten & Katrina M Brown, “Morality, Mobility and Citizenship: Legitimising Mobile 
Subjectivities in a Contested Outdoors” (2015) 64 Geoforum 342. 
119  Interviewee no 6, supra note 81. 
120  See Estair Van Wagner, “Putting Property in its Place: Relational Theory, Environmen-
tal Rights and Land Use Planning” (2013) 43:1 RGD 275 at 279–83.  
121  Interviewee no 6, supra note 81. 
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forts.”122 But as Don Mitchell and Carrie Breitbach ask, “Which social re-
lations make landscape’s forms?”123 On these terms, as Mitchell states 
elsewhere, the crucial query is not “whose landscape?”, but rather “land-
scape for whom?”124 Claims surrounding the loss of landscape value, as 
Mitchell has demonstrated in the fields of California,125 often promote ex-
clusionary tendencies. There are racialized, gendered, classed, and la-
boured implications of “spatially unjust landscape processes.”126 As an ex-
ample, in southwestern Ontario, despite the central importance of mi-
grant labour to the harvesting of crops—work which is undertaken by mi-
grant farmworkers from Mexico and the Caribbean who enter Canada 
under the exploitative terms of the seasonal agricultural workers pro-
gram127—the right to landscape most often articulated is one grounded in 
white, “propertied citizenship”.128 Sometimes, this notion goes as far as 
seeming to strive for a right to a landscape that does not include racial-
ized bodies at all, notwithstanding their centrality to the functioning of 
agricultural production in Norfolk County.129 Further, it is clear that the 
pressing settler-colonial imperative of erasing and denying Indigenous 
sovereignty plays a major role in structuring prevailing patterns of agri-
cultural land use, access, and control.130 
 On this understanding of landscape, we can see a complex relationship 
between people and place. In this relationship, following Don Mitchell and 
other critical geographers, place is shaped by the strivings of ordinary 
                                                  
122  Don Mitchell & Carrie Breitbach, “Landscape: Part I” in John A Agnew & James S 
Duncan, eds, The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Human Geography (Oxford, UK: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011) 209 at 211.  
123  Ibid [emphasis in original]. 
124  Don Mitchell, “Right to the City/Right to Landscape: From an Elitist to a More Just Ur-
ban Landscape in California’s East Bay Area” (talk delivered at Beit Zatoun, Toronto, 9 
July 2015), online: YouTube <www.youtube.com/watch?v=jxI8dye_GO0>. 
125  See Don Mitchell, The Lie of the Land: Migrant Workers and the California Landscape 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996) at 130–55. 
126  Setten & Brown, supra note 118 at 245. 
127  See Adrian A Smith, “Legal Consciousness and Resistance in Carribean Seasonal Agri-
cultural Workers” (2005) 20:2 CJLS 95. See also Vic Satzewich, Racism and the Incor-
poration of Foreign Labour: Farm Labour Migration to Canada since 1945 (London: 
Routledge, 1991). 
128  Adrian Smith, “The Bunk House Rules: A Materialist Approach to Legal Consciousness 
in the Context of Migrant Workers’ Housing in Ontario” (2015) 52:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 
863 at 898. 
129  See generally ibid (exploring the role of migrant workers in Norfolk County). 
130  See Adrian A Smith, “Toward a Critique of Political Economy of ‘Sociolegality’ in Settler 
Capitalist Canada” in Mark Thomas, Leah Vosko & Carlo Fanelli, eds, Change and 
Continuity: Rethinking the New Canadian Political Econonomy (Montreal & Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press) [forthcoming]. 
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people and infused within social relationships and processes of racializa-
tion, gender, class, and colonization. Rural identities in the global North, 
in particular, are shaped by “place and property relations” in such a way 
as to entrench existing privilege.131 We thus acknowledge that a right to 
landscape can work in a way which reinforces norms of propertied citizen-
ship and whiteness, and denies Indigenous sovereignty. As we show in the 
next part, however, we also hold on to its potential for countering the 
dominance of private property by exposing how this legal framework fails 
to fully capture the set of relations that people can have with land and 
landscape.132 As Indigenous legal scholars such as John Borrows and oth-
ers have argued for years, articulations of an alternative set of relations to 
land and landscape, claims that privilege “place” over property, would 
emphasize relations of responsibility and reciprocity with land and land-
scapes, rather than “rights” to them.133 
III. Situating Resistance to Green Energy  
 As we have demonstrated, the characterization of green energy re-
sistance in Ontario as pure NIMBYism unfairly, and sometimes errone-
ously, portrays critics of renewable energy projects as irrational and nar-
rowly self-interested actors. Even when the resistance has been recog-
nized as grounded in a place-based attachment to landscape, this too is 
brushed off as instrumental. These framings not only work in service of 
state interventions to limit public participation and local control over de-
cision making, but, we suggest, may establish troubling precedents as we 
move forward in the transition from fossil extractivism and limit the 
transformative potential of the green energy economy. 
                                                  
131  James McCarthy, “First World Political Ecology: Lessons from the Wise Use Move-
ment” (2002) 34:7 Environment & Planning A 1281 at 1295 [emphasis omitted] 
[McCarthy, “First World Political Ecology”].  
132  We agree with Van Wagner: “[I]t is possible to remain attuned to the danger of depoliti-
cization and parochialism of place, while simultaneously exploring opportunities to 
build relations of reciprocity with the land and foster progressive planning as we ‘learn 
to live well together in the land’” (Estair Van Wagner, “Law’s Rurality: Land Use Law 
and the Shaping of People-Place Relations in Rural Ontario” (2016) 47 J Rural Studies 
311 at 314 [references omitted] [Van Wagner, “Law’s Rurality”]). 
133  See e.g. John Borrows, “Living Between Water and Rocks: First Nations, Environmen-
tal Planning, and Democracy” (1997) 47:4 UTLJ 417; Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, 
“Land as Pedagogy: Nishnaabeg intelligence and rebellious transformation” (2014) 3:3 
Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 1.  See also Estair Van Wagner, 
“Law’s Ecological Relations: The Legal Structure of People-Place Relations in Ontario’s 
Aggregate Extraction Conflicts” (2016) 12 Projections: MIT J Planning 35 [Van Wagner, 
“Law’s Ecological Relations”]. 
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 Our preliminary results lend further support to other empirical find-
ings that local community resistance to renewable energy projects, while 
framed as NIMBYism, “often articulates with other, broader concerns” 134 
about governance, as well as procedural and distributive justice. In this 
respect, an engagement with the “sacrifice zones” framework is apt. In 
examining resistance to renewable energy through the sacrifice zone lens 
we strive to sharpen the analytical tools—and ultimately the practices—of 
environmental justice. How, then, should we receive, conceive of, and the-
orize this resistance? Recalling that we began from the premise that envi-
ronmental justice requires us to consider not just whether we tackle cli-
mate change by transitioning from fossil extractivism, but also how we 
undertake the transition, we argue that accounting for the distributive ef-
fects of renewable energy projects must occur with a view to shifting pow-
er relations and social dynamics. As demonstrated with respect to the ad-
verse health effects claims, failure to do so mimics the very tactics of 
“manufacturing uncertainty”, which the environmental justice movement 
has struggled to contest. 
 As the previous sections make clear, we cannot wholly accept the “sac-
rifice zone” characterization of the renewable energy resistance that we 
encountered in southwestern Ontario. Still, an engagement with it helps 
to clarify and sharpen our understanding of the challenges inherent in 
transitioning away from fossil extractivism. In each of the three registers 
of renewable energy resistance identified, we found meaningful and sub-
stantive concerns that expose deep tensions within green energy enthusi-
asm. Nor do we believe we can dismiss the resistance merely on the basis 
of the characteristics of the people or communities mounting it. Instead, 
in taking the resistance seriously, we need to deepen appreciation of how 
the claims are infused with and cannot be detached from broader rela-
tions of production and consumption. In line with Laura Pulido, we would 
not want a narrow emphasis on “race” in the environmental justice 
movement to prevent scholarly interrogation of these contemporary con-
flicts, which can advance nuanced understandings of how racism and set-
tler colonialism interact with the forces of capitalist production and con-
sumption to “create highly oppressive circumstances.”135 
 A goal of environmental justice activists is sometimes to “even out” 
burdens or sacrifices across a more diverse range of communities and, 
                                                  
134  Shaw et al, supra note 6 at 42. In the context of aggregate quarries, Estair Van Wagner 
characterized the resistance of residents to be “all at once instrumental and affective, 
conservative and transformative, exclusionary and reciprocal” (Van Wagner, “Law’s 
Ecological Relations”, supra note 133 at 47). 
135  Laura Pulido, “A Critical Review of the Methodology of Environmental Racism Re-
search” (1996) 28:2 Antipode 142 at 148.  
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where necessary, impose them on more affluent or relatively privileged 
peoples and communities “for the greater good.”136 These distributive jus-
tice concerns, as Shaw and her colleagues found in their recent empirical 
study of opposition to renewable energy projects across Canada, took on a 
particular tenor in the context of an urban-rural political divide in Ontario:  
 Urban Ontario receives the bulk of the energy produced while 
rural Ontario endures the impacts of wind energy infrastructure. 
Despite repeated claims of economic development opportunities and 
increased levels of local employment in rural areas, community 
members described their sense that few tangible benefits in the form 
of jobs or community economic development have transpired, beyond 
landowners leasing their property for turbines. Rather, host com-
munities expressed the feeling that multinational developers and in-
stitutional investors have accrued most of the economic benefits.137  
 The Green Energy Act, 2009’s transfer of decision-making authority 
from local municipalities to the province exacerbated the urban-rural di-
vision.138 Opportunities for public involvement prescribed by the province 
included modest and “formulaic open houses in which communities re-
sponded to plans after they were formed. There were no opportunities for 
community members to collaboratively discuss the benefits and risks of 
hosting wind turbines, or have any material influence over the out-
come.”139 This situation left many municipalities upset at the province’s 
aggressive promotion of wind power at the expense of local control, with 
few options other than to declare themselves “unwilling hosts”.140 Munici-
pal disputes also emerged over solar power, albeit in far less pronounced 
and protracted terms.141 
                                                  
136  Although, as Daniel Faber argues, the movement must strive for more than just a “‘fair’ 
distribution” of environmental harms (Daniel Faber, “A More ‘Productive’ Environmen-
tal Justice Politics: Movement Alliances in Massachusetts for Clean Production and 
Regional Equity” in Ronald Sandler & Phaedra C Pezzullo, eds, Environmental Justice 
and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to the Environmental Movement 
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2007) 135 at 145). 
137  Shaw et al, supra note 6 at 46. 
138  See Green Energy Act, 2009, supra note 22, s 5. Shaw and her colleagues remark that 
“communities began to see the provincial government as a proponent rather than neu-
tral arbiter of wind development” (Shaw et al, supra note 6 at 45). See also Stephen D 
Hill & James D Knott, “Too Close for Comfort: Social Controversies Surrounding Wind 
Farm Noise Setback Policies in Ontario” [2010] 2 Renewable Energy L & Policy Rev 
153.  
139  Shaw et al, supra note 6 at 45.  
140  Martin, supra note 80. 
141  Failing Hamilton city council approval, for instance, Samsung Renewable Energy with-
drew its application for a “60,000-solar-panel farm” project to be built in Flamborough 
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 In the end, to the extent that the provincial green energy agenda at-
tempted to foist sacrifices on segments of rural Ontario, it had limited 
success. Although the struggle is still in progress, it is evident that the 
Ontario government has recently been forced to backtrack on its initial 
green energy policy, in what commentators are referring to as a green en-
ergy “reversal”.142 While we do not credit the dramatic policy shift solely to 
the types of resistance we describe here, we do believe it played some role 
in repelling burdens—but not before certain rural residents and commu-
nities experienced health, arable land, food sovereignty, and landscape 
value effects. The capacity of residents to re-shift these burdens under-
scores their enduring privilege.143 In this respect, environmental burdens, 
even in a green energy economy, continue to flow along familiar gradients. 
What Lerner says distinguishes residents of sacrifice zones under extrac-
tivism—the more classic “downwinders” of environmental justice stories—
is that they are “required to make disproportionate health and economic 
sacrifices that more affluent people can avoid.”144 That those resisting 
green energy projects in Ontario were not, by and large, racialized or 
marginalized low-income communities is significant, and perhaps helps to 
explain their recent successes.145 In fact, as explored in the previous part, 
the relative political power of those mounting resistance might be at-
tributed to their strategic deployment of whiteness and propertied citizen-
ship. 
 Anna Willow has argued recently that, increasingly, people every-
where are contending with environmental changes “that they did not au-
thorize and do not benefit from.”146 We believe that our analysis here 
demonstrates that these feelings are strongly articulated in the language 
of environmental justice, regardless of whether the communities them-
selves can be characterized as racialized, marginalized or oppressed. Wil-
low argues that scholars have “overlooked the potential of environmental 
      
(“Samsung Pulls Plug on Flamborough Solar Farm”, CBC News (8 August 2015), 
online: <www.cbc.ca>). 
142  See Ontario, “Ontario Suspends Procurement”, supra note 85. See also Rob Ferguson, 
“Ontario Government Scraps Plan for $3.8 Billion in Renewable Energy Projects”, To-
ronto Star (27 September 2016), online: <www.thestar.com>. 
143  See e.g. Laura Pulido, “Rethinking Environmental Racism: White Privilege and Urban 
Development in Southern California” (2000) 90:1 Annals Assoc American Geographers 
12. 
144  Lerner, supra note 2 at 3. 
145  While we did document some resistance by members of the Six Nations community, the 
overwhelming majority of those who make up the wind and solar resistance movements 
in southwestern Ontario are white, middle-class property owners. 
146  Anna J Willow, “The New Politics of Environmental Degradation: Un/expected Land-
scapes of Disempowerment and Vulnerability” (2014) 21 J Political Ecology 237 at 240.  
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degradation to indicate groups’ changing status,” mapping, in her study of 
white anti-fracking activists in Ohio, the articulations of environmental 
injustice “among those for whom disempowerment and vulnerability are 
new experiences.”147 We agree with Willow that investigating the impacts 
of uninvited environmental change on relatively privileged communities 
may “expose ongoing structural shifts.”148 
 Environmental justice scholarship understands the pollution burdens 
on poor and racialized communities to stem primarily from structural in-
equities, such as a lack of “political and financial resources to challenge ... 
siting decisions.”149 Environmental justice activism has thus been couched 
in terms of “environmentalism of the poor”150 and contrasted with the 
“[e]cology of [a]ffluence”,151 which Ramachandra Guha describes as a “lux-
ury, leisure-time concern,”152 often focused on the “conservation of remote, 
wild landscapes.”153 This kind of environmentalism is more likely to be 
characterized as affection for “particular representations of nature,”154 as 
opposed to stemming from meaningful contact and interactions with the 
land in question. However, as Leah Horowitz argues: 
[N]ot all the environmental concerns of the relatively affluent result 
from boredom and self-indulgence ... [T]hey, too, may oppose the sit-
ing of environmentally destructive facilities or infrastructure in their 
own neighborhood. When such concerns are expressed by the middle 
or upper classes, particularly in the developed world, they are often 
contemptuously labeled NIMBY (not in my backyard) and glossed 
                                                  
147  Ibid at 242. There are interesting parallels between the tactics of renewable energy 
company representatives described to us and the tactics of the “landmen” (i.e., corporate 
agents) in the shale gas context. Many of our informants argued, as did participants in 
Willow’s study, that “the activities of a powerful industry are infringing on fundamental 
rights and undermining core democratic values” (ibid at 247).  
148  Ibid at 242. 
149  Leah S Horowitz, “Power, Profit, Protest: Grassroots Resistance to Industry in the 
Global North” (2012) 23:3 Capital Nature Socialism 20 at 24. 
150  See generally Joan Martinez-Alier, “Ecology and the Poor: A Neglected Dimension of 
Latin American History” (1991) 23:3 J Latin American Studies 621; Joan Martinez-
Alier, The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Conflicts and Valuation 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2002). See also Ramachandra Guha, “The Environ-
mentalism of the Poor” in Richard G Fox & Orin Starn, eds, Between Resistance and 
Revolution: Cultural Politics and Social Protest (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Universi-
ty Press, 1997) 17. 
151  J Martinez-Alier, “Distributional Obstacles to International Environmental Policy: The 
Failures at Rio and Prospects After Rio” (1993) 2:2 Environmental Values 97 at 118. 
152  Guha, supra note 150 at 18–19. 
153  Horowitz, supra note 149 at 24. 
154  Dan Brockington, “Powerful Environmentalisms: Conservation, Celebrity and Capital-
ism” (2008) 30:4 Media, Culture & Society 551 at 553 [emphasis in original]. 
“SACRIFICE ZONES” IN THE GREEN ENERGY ECONOMY 895 
 
 
over as attempts to resist a LULU (locally unwanted land use). Stud-
ies of NIMBY have uncovered its complexity, noting that no instance 
‘‘branded with this name’’ perfectly fits its definition.155 
 Maarten Wolsink and others have insisted that, rather than resulting 
from selfishness and instrumentalism, this resistance is often about “eq-
uity and fairness”,156 or “place attachment”157 and its associated identities. 
In other words, those engaged in activism characterized as NIMBYism 
and those engaged in environmental justice struggles “often share similar 
concerns despite their obviously different socio-economic conditions.”158 In 
this respect, we join with political ecologists such as James McCarthy who 
might emphasize the similarities rather than the differences between 
these groups.159 McCarthy notes how rurality in the contemporary global 
North is constructed around an identity of marginality; that is, rural resi-
dents often “believe themselves to be marginal.”160 They sense that their 
populations are shrinking relative to cities; that they are experiencing a 
declining political significance. McCarthy notes that they often express 
the sense that their communities are “run by and for external inter-
ests”:161 we certainly heard in our interviews several different articula-
tions of the sentiment that “all those environmentalists down in Toronto 
should have turbines in their own backyards, if they like renewable ener-
gy so much.” As Van Wagner notes, the “working landscapes of rural plac-
es” are often construed as “a potential sacrifice zone where resource de-
mands can be satisfied.”162 
 A meaningful engagement with renewable energy resistance demands 
an analytical framework which allows us to receive those claims based on 
adverse health effects, competing land uses, and landscape values within 
an understanding of how each is shaped by social processes and relations 
of racialization, class, and settler colonialism. In particular, we must pre-
                                                  
155  Horowitz, supra note 149 at 24 [references omitted]. 
156  See Maarten Wolsink, “Wind Power Implementation: The Nature of Public Attitudes: 
Equity and Fairness Instead of ‘Backyard Motives’” (2007) 11:6 Renewable Sustainable 
Energy Reviews 1188. 
157  See Patrick Devine-Wright & Yuko Howes, “Disruption to Place Attachment and the 
Protection of Restorative Environments: A Wind Energy Case Study” (2010) 30:3 J En-
vironmental Psychology 271. 
158  Horowitz, supra note 149 at 24. 
159  McCarthy’s influential study applied the insights of what was previously thought of as 
“Third World political ecology” in the context of the land and logging struggles in the 
First World of the American West (see generally McCarthy, “First World Political Ecol-
ogy”, supra note 131). 
160  Ibid at 1285. 
161  Ibid at 1296. 
162  Van Wagner, “Law’s Rurality”, supra note 132 at 311. 
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serve the ability to take seriously the counter-hegemonic potential of the 
right to landscape claim, grounded in a “sense of place”, in appropriate 
situations or contexts. In thinking through the counter-hegemonic poten-
tial of that claim, we are reminded of James McCarthy’s comment that 
“[not] everyone is always fully aware or supportive of the critiques of capi-
talism that might be implicit in their particular environmental con-
cerns.”163 
 The notion of narrow economic self-interest underlying the NIMBYism 
construction also invites the idea that community benefits would mitigate 
concerns, but in fact scholarship on community ownership of renewable 
energy projects downplays the role of economic gain in garnering support: 
Derek Bell and his colleagues found that it was as much about local con-
trol and involvement as it was about any potential profits.164 Similarly, 
according to Willow, “uninvited environmental change transforms people’s 
understandings of and relationships to the natural world,” leading to feel-
ings of disempowerment and vulnerability.165 After describing his own ex-
perience of devastating health effects and ruined relationships with 
neighbours and friends he attributes to a wind turbine, one resident we 
interviewed sighed and stated, “I think really what it boils down to is the 
unfairness of the process.”166 For us, this comment goes to the notion of 
“local control” meant to be cast aside by the NIMBYism label. Those de-
manding local control over landscapes are, in some ways, seeking a radi-
cal departure from the prevailing capitalist organization of renewable en-
ergy development. It is crucial to emphasize that, in the context of Ontar-
io, the transition to renewables is fuelling the trend away from public 
ownership of energy-generating assets.167 Thus, at the end of the day, as 
much as the government would construe this resistance as conservative 
and self-serving, it is presenting obstacles for capital, and perhaps even 
                                                  
163  James McCarthy, “We Have Never Been ‘Post-political’” (2013) 24:1 Capital Nature So-
cialism 19 at 21 [McCarthy, “Post-Political”]. 
164  See Bell et al, supra note 35 at 126–31. The significant growth in small-scale renewa-
bles achieved across Germany and Denmark in the 1990s is said to have been 
achieved through both the distribution of shares and local control over the terms of 
development (see Julie L MacArthur, Empowering Electricity: Co-operatives, Sustain-
ability, and Power Sector Reform in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016) at 18–19). 
Still, most wind energy projects in Ontario primarily deliver profits to corporate de-
velopers and individualized benefits to a small number of large-parcel landholders 
leasing land to those developers in order to host turbines (see Fast & Mabee, supra 
note 81 at 33–34). 
165  Willow, supra note 146 at 237 [emphasis added].  
166  Interviewee no 4, supra note 48. 
167  See MacArthur, supra note 166.   
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acts as a countervailing force to neo-liberalizing trends, even though it is 
not “explicitly oriented against the deepening of capitalist relations”.168 
Conclusion 
 The resistance to green energy projects in southwestern Ontario pre-
sents some challenging questions for environmental justice scholars and 
activists. In considering how to receive claims about adverse health effects 
of wind power (i.e., “wind turbine syndrome”), we argued that our attitude 
toward the claims should be based less on the identity of the residents 
complaining, and more on an analysis of power relations and social dy-
namics in relation to knowledge and expertise. In considering how we 
should adjudicate claims to land as between those who want to preserve it 
for food production, and those who would use it for solar power genera-
tion, we called for the development of nuanced accounts of food justice 
that can take these tensions into consideration. With respect to Indige-
nous peoples’ struggles for food sovereignty, we argued that the settler-
colonial context must be considered and the ongoing subordination of In-
digenous law to colonial law is a pressing matter of concern for environ-
mental justice scholars. 
 Finally, and most profoundly, we considered how we should receive 
claims by residents that renewable energy projects are interfering with 
the “landscape”. When people articulate a connection to land and an affec-
tion for a landscape, a complicated set of questions come into view for en-
vironmental justice scholars. Recognizing that these claims may have ex-
clusionary and even racist tendencies, we can also see their potential for 
affirming the attachments of non-owners to land and for extending rights 
to a collective that may challenge entrenched capitalist conceptions of 
what is possible on a landscape. To return to the Site C example raised at 
the outset of this article, it is clear that, in that context, the climate im-
perative—to reduce greenhouse gas emissions—is now a critical settler-
state imperative. And the Site C dam, the displacement and dispossession 
of Indigenous communities, is justified on climate grounds. Here, the sev-
erance of links between land and livelihood and the dismissal of collective 
claims for the preservation of a landscape that has sustained a people, 
since time immemorial, clearly demonstrates the need to preserve the 
possibility that those claims can be heard by environmental justice schol-
ars, as we confront the “voracious appetite for resources and land”169 that 
is inherent in not only fossil extractivism, but in the green energy econo-
my as well. 
                                                  
168  McCarthy, “First World Political Ecology”, supra note 131 at 1298. 
169  Dalby, supra note 26 at 13. 
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 We conclude that resistance to green energy projects as it is emerging 
on the ground should not be so easily dismissed as mere NIMBYism. At 
the same time, the approach to renewable energy governance that emerg-
es from this study of resistance in southwestern Ontario reveals “modes of 
regulation that are simultaneously effective in reducing carbon emissions 
while not threatening the power structures that have caused the problems 
in the first place.”170 As mentioned, the growth in renewables fuelled by 
the Green Energy Act in Ontario corresponds with a greater proportion of 
energy generating assets under private control. The counterhegemonic 
potential at the core of green energy resistance, then, derives from its 
troubling of the profit-driven incentive structures and lack of participa-
tory engagement that characterize green energy enthusiasm in its current 
form. Naomi Klein, in This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Cli-
mate, states that sacrifice zones in an extractivist economy are those 
“places that, to their extractors, somehow don’t count and therefore can be 
poisoned, drained, or otherwise destroyed, for the supposed greater good 
of economic progress.”171 She acknowledges that this logic “predate[s] in-
dustrial-scale extraction of fossil fuels.”172 Our point is that it may outlast 
fossil-capitalism as well, if a narrow focus on climate justice, or a shallow 
conception of the green economy, prevents us from seeing the fundamen-
tal reimagining of our economies that needs to take place. In seeking to 
preserve possibilities in the green energy economy for “true politics[—
]antagonism, deep dissent, [and] the space for the imagination [and artic-
ulation] of genuine alternatives”173—we feel it is important to take re-
sistance seriously.  
    
                                                  
170  Ibid at 12.  
171  Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs The Climate (New York: Alfred A 
Knopf Canada, 2014) at 169. 
172  Ibid at 170. 
173  McCarthy, “Post-political”, supra note 163 at 22.  
